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9.1 Introduction
During the onset of the Korean ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, an ineﬃcient cor-
porate bankruptcy system had a detrimental eﬀect on Korea’s economy.
Prior to the crisis, in 1996 and the ﬁrst three-quarters of 1997, many large-
sized ﬁrms facing bankruptcy actively sought shelter under the court-
administered rehabilitation procedures. However, the inadequacies of the
bankruptcy system led to poor discipline in targeting the appropriate ﬁ-
nancially distressed ﬁrms to undergo the rehabilitation procedure. Mean-
while, before the outbreak of the economic crisis, the uncertainty and de-
lay encountered in dealing with failing ﬁrms clearly added to the distortion
of the resource allocation process in Korea’s economy.
In other words, the exit barriers for large ﬁrms seemed to have decreased
the eﬃciency of resource allocation before the onset of the crisis. Prior to
the crisis, Korea’s corporate bankruptcy system had a tendency to work as
a de facto exit barrier. For example, before the reform, producers with per-
sistently declining productivity were more likely to be accepted in some re-
habilitation procedure if they were deemed as having high social value,
such as a large output or employment share in the economy.
Hence, the natural course of action for postcrisis Korea was to undertake
a sweeping reform of its corporate bankruptcy system. As was the case with
other structural reforms in the corporate sector, reforming Korea’s bank-
ruptcy policy was pushed forward based on the belief that new reforms were
essential in preventing recurrent economic crises from plaguing the econ-
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Youngjae Lim and Chin Hee Hahnomy. Yet past experiences of crisis-hit countries suggest that there is a strong
possibility that incomplete or weak reforms will often lead to recurrent eco-
nomic crises. Despite this suggestion, to the best of our knowledge, there are
few empirical studies that examine how bankruptcy reforms in postcrisis
Korea aﬀect the eﬃciency of resource reallocation and, ultimately, total
factor productivity (TFP) growth in Korea’s economy.1
Against this backdrop, our study aims at addressing the eﬀects of bank-
ruptcy policy reform by analyzing data at the ﬁrm or plant level. First, by
employing ﬁrm-level panel data, the study examines how the postcrisis re-
forms in the bankruptcy policy aﬀected the productivity dynamics of fail-
ing ﬁrms. The analysis focuses on bankruptcy procedures administered by
the courts. These in-court settlements are necessary for failing ﬁrms faced
with bankruptcy that are unsuccessful in securing an out-of-court settle-
ment after exhausting all options. Maintaining discipline in in-court bank-
ruptcy procedures would have far-reaching consequences on out-of-court
bankruptcy procedures, since the discipline would act as an eﬀective and
credible deterrent for failing, but not yet bankrupt, ﬁrms.
We  examine whether the ﬁrms accepted under the reformed court-
administered rehabilitation procedures experienced less persistent prob-
lems in their prebankruptcy TFP compared to ﬁrms undergoing the same
process before the reforms. We expect that, if the reform in the in-court
bankruptcy procedures is successful, then only rehabilitation programs
would accept ﬁrms with temporary diﬃculties, whereas failing ﬁrms with
persistently declining productivity would be rejected. Successful reform of
the corporate bankruptcy system would then imply an improvement in the
eﬃciency of resource reallocation.
Second, to formulate an idea of how bankruptcy policy reform con-
tributes to preventing prolonged economic stagnation, we examine how
the reforms improved the eﬃciency of resource reallocation and, in turn,
aggregate TFP growth.
Previous studies have documented that the resource reallocation process
from exiting producers to entering producers explains a substantial por-
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1. There are some recent studies that begin by examining the determinants of the divergent
growth path of crisis-hit countries and (simply) suggest that policies such as bankruptcy pol-
icy reform are possible candidates. However, these studies do not use details of institutions at
the micro level to analyze the eﬀect of bankruptcy policy reform on the resource reallocation
process of the economy. For instance, Hayashi and Prescott (2000) show that the Japanese
economy’s poor performance in the 1990s was due to failure to improve productivity and not
the failure to accumulate inputs. Based on this ﬁnding and other evidence, they further sug-
gest that the industrial policy of protecting failing or declining industries or ﬁrms by the
Japanese government is the main culprit behind the “lost decade.” Meanwhile, in a compara-
tive study of Chile and Mexico, Bergoeing et al. (2001) show that the decade-long divergent
growth paths of the two countries since the ﬁnancial crisis in the early 1980s are predomi-
nantly driven by the diﬀerences in TFP growth rates. They suggest that policies such as the
bankruptcy policy reform are candidates for explaining the diﬀerent paths of the two coun-
tries.tion of TFP changes at the aggregate level. Most of the studies ﬁnd that
exiting producers exhibit persistently declining productivity while enter-
ing producers that survive the market selection process exhibit rapidly in-
creasing productivity (e.g., Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 1998; Hahn
2000). This pattern suggests that policies that prevent the eﬃcient reallo-
cation of resources via entry and exit could be potentially very costly, with
the cost possibly growing over time. On the contrary, bankruptcy policy re-
forms, which induce ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exit with a lower cost and allocate
released resources to eﬃcient entrants or incumbents, would enhance the
rate of aggregate productivity growth.
In this study, we use Korean manufacturing plant-level data to ask
whether the productivity dynamics of entering and exiting producers hold
in Korea. Speciﬁcally, we answer the following questions. What kinds of
time proﬁles do the TFP numbers of exiting and entering producers ex-
hibit? Given the pattern of productivity dynamics, how does the competi-
tive process of entry and exit improve aggregate productivity? Can we ex-
pect the policies that improve the eﬃciency of resource reallocation, such
as bankruptcy policy reform, to improve aggregate TFP instantaneously
or over a period of time?
The outline of this study is as follows. Section 9.2 examines the eﬀects of
the postcrisis bankruptcy policy reform in Korea on the resource realloca-
tion process using the ﬁrm-level data. In particular, we discuss the key ele-
ments in the postcrisis bankruptcy reforms and then proceed to analyze the
TFP performance of failing ﬁrms entering the court-administered rehabil-
itation procedures before and after the reform. Section 9.3 examines the
mechanism by which the reform improves the eﬃciency of resource reallo-
cation or the performance of aggregate TFP. Our analysis uses plant-level
panel data on the Korean manufacturing sector. Section 9.4 summarizes
and concludes.
9.2 Bankruptcy Policy Reform and the 
Productivity Dynamics of Failing Firms
9.2.1 Corporate Bankruptcy System prior to the Economic Crisis
Exit Barriers for Large Firms
Past Korean economic growth was made possible by the growth or re-
structuring of existing ﬁrms rather than by the dynamic entry and exit pro-
cess. During the period of development when proﬁtable new markets were
rapidly emerging, the inadequate corporate bankruptcy system did not sig-
niﬁcantly distort the resource allocation of the economy due to the ability
of the economy to easily reallocate resources from declining sectors to
emerging proﬁtable sectors. Under these circumstances, through rational-
ization programs, the government played an active role in reallocating re-
Bankruptcy Policy Reform and Total Factor Productivity Dynamics 299sources from failing ﬁrms to other existing ﬁrms. At the same time, many
of the failing ﬁrms were not ﬁling for bankruptcy procedures overseen by
the courts.2
In particular, most small and medium-sized bankrupt ﬁrms were eﬀec-
tively liquidated on a nonjudicial basis. A bankrupt ﬁrm’s debt was usually
collected on an individual basis under the Civil Procedure Act. Most of the
bankrupt ﬁrm’s assets were already subject to mortgage or security, conse-
quently leaving little for unsecured creditors. Additional procedures for
the collection of debt were not necessary.3
For large ﬁrms, however, the too-big-to-fail argument played a part in
building exit barriers in the sense that ineﬃcient ﬁrms were often allowed
to operate through some explicit or hidden subsidies from the government.
Several large-sized bankrupt ﬁrms were periodically bailed out through
the government’s various rationalization measures, undercutting Korea’s
formal bankruptcy procedures.
Since the early 1990s, however, Korea’s inadequate corporate bank-
ruptcy system began to distort the economy’s resource allocation, which
increasingly grew until the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis in 1997. Since
the early 1990s, some failing ﬁrms began to enter court-administered bank-
ruptcy procedures, but the bankruptcy system was often abused by con-
trolling shareholders of the failing ﬁrms.
By enacting the Rule on Corporate Reorganization Procedure in 1992,
the Supreme Court began to shift toward improving judicial bankruptcy
procedures. In particular, the new rule established conditions for initiating
corporate reorganization proceedings. These conditions were high social
value, ﬁnancial distress, and potential for rehabilitation. Interestingly,
however, economic eﬃciency was not a condition for corporate reorgan-
ization. The new rule tended to give preference to larger failing ﬁrms for in-
court corporate bankruptcy settlements, thereby creating a de facto exit
barrier for large ﬁrms. For example, producers with persistently declining
productivity were more likely to be accepted in one of the rehabilitation
procedures if they were deemed as having high social value such as a large
output or employment share in the economy.
Exit Barriers from the Controlling Shareholders of Failing Firms
Prior to the economic crisis, the controlling shareholders of large failing
ﬁrms often sought to take shelter under court-administered rehabilitation
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2. One technical hurdle in enforcing judicial bankruptcy procedures was the Act on Spe-
cial Measures for Unpaid Loans of Financial Institutions. The act gave the Korea Asset Man-
agement Corporation (KAMCO) the authority to hold auctions of the bankrupt ﬁrm’s assets
before the initiation of court procedures. The act basically nulliﬁed the Corporate Reorgan-
ization Act because the auction of assets by KAMCO eﬀectively preempted the corporate re-
organization process. In 1990, the Constitutional Court declared this provision unconstitu-
tional, paving the way for the expanded use of judicial bankruptcy procedures.
3. See Nam, Oh, and Kim (1999) for the details on the Korean bankruptcy system prior to
the 1990s.procedures. However, the inadequacies of the bankruptcy system led to
poor discipline in targeting the appropriate ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms to
undergo the rehabilitation procedure. This problem was particularly ac-
centuated given the growing number of distressed ﬁrms.
The frequent abuse of the corporate reorganization procedure, high-
lighted by several notorious cases involving controlling shareholders of
failing ﬁrms, forced the court to amend the system in 1996. In particular,
the court argued for wiping out shares held by controlling shareholders
responsible for a ﬁrm’s failure. The introduction of the amendment in 1996
produced an unintended consequence: Controlling shareholders of failing
ﬁrms pursued other means that would allow them to retain their ownership
and control. Controlling shareholders found a loophole in the bankruptcy
proceedings through the composition procedure, which was originally de-
signed for small and medium-sized ﬁrms with less complex capital struc-
tures. However, before the law’s revision after the crisis, the composition
procedure did not contain an explicit limit on a ﬁrm’s size and enabled ex-
isting management of larger ﬁrms to retain control.
As shown in table 9.1, there was a dramatic rise in bankruptcy ﬁlings for
the composition procedure. The number of cases increased from nine cases
in 1996 to 322 in 1997 and to 728 in 1998. In the ﬁrst three-quarters of 1997,
before the onset of the crisis, many large ﬁrms on the verge of ﬁnancial col-
lapse sought to ﬁle for bankruptcy under the composition procedure. Kia
Motors was among the many that ﬁled for composition procedure. This
ﬁrm deserves special attention. In the case of Kia Motors, the debtor and
creditors initially sought to ﬁle for diﬀerent procedures: Kia, the debtor,
initially ﬁled for composition procedure, but shortly thereafter creditors
decided to ﬁle for corporate reorganization. In cases where involved par-
ties ﬁle for diﬀerent proceedings, as was the case with Kia Motors, corpo-
rate reorganization overrides a composition ﬁling. In the end, the court ac-
cepted Kia Motors’ bankruptcy ﬁling for corporate reorganization, but the
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Table 9.1 Bankruptcy Filings before and after the Crisis (unit: number of cases, %)
Bankruptcy 
Procedure 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Reorganization 79 52 132 148 37 32 31 19
(76.0) (65.8) (26.8) (14.9) (9.1) (13.2) (12.3) (15.3)
Composition 13 9 322 728 140 78 51 23
(12.5) (11.4) (65.5) (73.3) (34.4) (32.2) (20.2) (18.6)
Liquidation 12 18 38 117 230 132 170 82
(11.5) (22.8) (7.7) (11.8) (56.5) (54.6) (67.5) (66.1)
Total 104 79 492 993 407 242 252 124
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Supreme Court of Korea (various issues).
Notes: The year 2002 covers January to October. Numbers in parentheses denote the percentage.uncertainty and delay resulting from the ineﬃcient bankruptcy system in
dealing with large failing ﬁrms (such as Kia Motors) clearly worsened the
situation of the economy.
9.2.2 Postcrisis Bankruptcy Policy Reforms
The economic crisis of 1997 placed tremendous strain on the existing
corporate bankruptcy system for both in-court and out-of-court proceed-
ings because of the soaring number and scale of bankruptcies. Table 9.1
shows that the ﬁlings for judicial bankruptcy procedures rose dramatically
in 1997. The fallout from the economic crisis on the bankruptcy system
was the main driving force in implementing revisions in the bankruptcy
laws and procedures. In addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
required that improvements be made in the corporate bankruptcy system
as a condition for the bailout package.
After the economic crisis, the Korean government implemented reform
eﬀorts to remove exit barriers along two separate lines: One involved the
court-administered bankruptcy procedure, and the other included the pre-
bankruptcy informal arrangements for corporate restructuring. Whereas
the workout procedure had a signiﬁcant impact on the corporate restruc-
turing of larger failing ﬁrms, the court-administered procedures focused
on the restructuring of medium-sized failing ﬁrms.
In this study, we focus on policy reform in the court-administered bank-
ruptcy system. Except for small ﬁrms with less complex capital structures,
the court-administered bankruptcy procedures would be the last resort for
insolvent ﬁrms if the interested parties could not agree on the prebank-
ruptcy informal arrangements for corporate restructuring. For prebank-
ruptcy informal arrangements, one of the most eﬀective disciplines should
come from that of the court-administered bankruptcy procedures. In other
words, during out-of-court informal settlements the incentives of inter-
ested parties would be directly aﬀected by what they expect the outcome of
the court-administered bankruptcy proceedings to be.
Bankruptcy Policy Reform in 1998: Economic Eﬃciency Criterion 
and the Removal of the Exit Barriers for Large Firms
The most crucial element in the postcrisis court-administered bankruptcy
system was the court’s establishment and tight enforcement of an economic
eﬃciency criterion in selecting qualiﬁed ﬁrms for judicial bankruptcy pro-
cedures. Instead of being based on economic eﬃciency, the prereform sys-
tem was based on high social value and prospects for rehabilitation. Pres-
ently, a comparison of a distressed ﬁrm’s value as a going concern with its
liquidation value is required to initiate judicial bankruptcy proceedings.
The new criterion greatly contributed to removing the de facto exit bar-
rier placed on large ﬁrms that had existed in the in-court bankruptcy sys-
tem prior to the crisis. Prior to the crisis, producers with persistently de-
302 Youngjae Lim and Chin Hee Hahnclining productivity were more likely to be accepted into a rehabilitation
procedure as long as they exhibited high social value such as a large output
or employment share in the economy.
The reforms initiated in 1998 represented the most dramatic change in
the system since the enactment of the corporate bankruptcy laws in 1962.
However, in the wake of the crisis, in an eﬀort to quickly implement the re-
forms, the government was not successful in initiating a fully comprehen-
sive revision.4 The shortcomings of the ﬁrst reforms resulted in another
round of revisions in 1999. The two revisions to the bankruptcy laws sig-
niﬁcantly expanded the role of the courts in the corporate bankruptcy pro-
cess. If not for the workout procedure introduced as an out-of-court settle-
ment in 1998, the role of the courts would have been much greater.
Besides the economic eﬃciency criterion, the 1998 reforms attempted to
speed up bankruptcy proceedings. The revisions introduced time limits for
critical steps in the proceedings, such as for the decision on stay, the report
of debts and equities, the approval of the reorganization plan, and other re-
lated steps. Additional changes in the 1998 revision included the following.
First, the reforms established mechanisms to induce a more active role for
the creditors, such as introducing a creditor’s conference. Second, to en-
hance the court’s capacity to deal with a large volume of bankruptcy cases,
the court receivership committee was introduced as a special advisor to
oversee the critical steps in the proceedings. Third, the process of wiping
out the shares of controlling shareholders was strengthened and made
more transparent. Fourth, to prevent the abuse of the composition proce-
dure, some critical enhancements were made to the Composition Act. For
example, large ﬁrms with complex capital structures were not allowed to
ﬁle bankruptcy under the composition procedure. Table 9.1 shows the im-
pact resulting from changes to the Composition Act, as the number of
composition ﬁlings decreased sharply from 728 in 1998 to 140 in 1999.
Bankruptcy Policy Reform in 1999: Mandatory Liquidation System
Despite these signiﬁcant revisions in 1998, there was room for further re-
form, as mentioned previously. To some extent, in fact, the 1999 reforms
ﬁlled the gap between the initial reform proposals and what was ﬁnally
passed in the 1998 revisions. While the revisions were being developed in
1999, there was an initial debate on the inclusion of an automatic stay pro-
vision for the new law. Under an automatic stay, the debtors’ assets would
be automatically protected from creditors seeking to secure their claims.
After strong arguments were presented for both sides on the issue of auto-
matic stay, the ﬁnal compromise was to speed up the initiation of the pro-
ceedings to within a month of the ﬁling.
Bankruptcy Policy Reform and Total Factor Productivity Dynamics 303
4. See Koo (1998) for the details on the bankruptcy policy reform in 1998. Right after the
ﬁnancial crisis broke out in December 1997, the bankruptcy policy reform was made in Feb-
ruary 1998.Although the automatic stay provision can enhance the rehabilitation of
failing ﬁrms after bankruptcy, the debtor may choose to utilize the court in
order to avoid a formal default and thereby evade criminal punishment un-
der the Illegal Check Control Act. According to the Illegal Check Control
Act, the managers or controlling owners of failing ﬁrms who issued bad
checks are criminally liable. The objective of the act was to overcome the
informational asymmetry between debtors and creditors. Creditors faced
with highly unreliable accounting information would be less willing to fa-
cilitate loans to debtors without a credible means of recourse. As a result,
debtors are forced to make a credible commitment to repayment by risking
incarceration in the case of default.
The new revision also facilitated an eﬃcient transition between corpo-
rate reorganization and liquidation. After the initiation decision, the court
must compare the going-concern value of the ﬁrm with its liquidation
value. If the liquidation value is larger than the going-concern value, the
court must declare the liquidation of the ﬁrm. Donga Construction, which
was liquidated in early 2001, was the ﬁrst large ﬁrm to travel down this
path. The mandatory liquidation provision could be considered as a re-
form that contributes to enhance the eﬃciency of bankruptcy system.
However, the mandatory liquidation provision created an unintended
consequence. The possibility of liquidation instilled fear among failing
ﬁrms to a point where many attempted to avoid the judicial rehabilitation
procedures. Resolving this problem in the current judicial bankruptcy sys-
tem remains one of the major future policy objectives in Korea.
9.2.3 Bankruptcy Policy Reform and the 
Productivity Dynamics of Bankruptcy Cohorts
Firms go bankrupt due to their inability to pay their debts. A critical el-
ement in designing a corporate bankruptcy system is the ability to distin-
guish (or to elicit information on) whether an insolvent ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial dis-
tress is temporary or persistent. One method by which to resolve this issue
empirically is analyzing the productivity of insolvent ﬁrms. In the study, we
construct TFP measures for the ﬁrms in our data set to evaluate the per-
formance of the corporate bankruptcy system instituted after the eco-
nomic crisis. We examine a failing ﬁrm’s cross-sectional distribution of
corporate bankruptcy and time series productivity before and after bank-
ruptcy ﬁling.
Use of Bankruptcy Procedures by Chaebol Category after the Crisis
Table 9.2 shows the composition of bankruptcy procedures applied to in-
solvent ﬁrms by chaebol category from 1997 to 1999. The table demon-
strates the relative share of bankruptcy procedures among insolvent ﬁrms,
weighted by the size of assets. The insolvent ﬁrms in a given year include
only those that went bankrupt for the ﬁrst time in that year and exclude






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.those from other years; hence, the table gives us the incidence of new bank-
ruptcies in the speciﬁc year. By focusing on the year cohorts, we can con-
trol for various year-speciﬁc eﬀects and single out the relationship between
the various rehabilitation settlements and the size factor over time.
Once ﬁrms are insolvent, they can enter into either court-administered
or out-of-court settlements, including corporate reorganization, composi-
tion, or workout procedures. But not all ﬁrms enter into one of these reha-
bilitation programs; instead, some are simply left bankrupt for a prolonged
period of time. Firms under these circumstances are cut oﬀ from credit,
which limits them to only cash transactions.
Table 9.2 shows the relative share of diﬀerent types of settlements for
new chaebolbankruptcies from 1997 to 1999. The ﬁrms that went bankrupt
in 1997 show a clear pattern. For the top thirty chaebols, the majority (94
percent in terms of asset size) was accepted into corporate reorganization,
whereas only a fraction (6 percent in terms of asset size) was accepted into
composition. On the other hand, quite a signiﬁcant proportion of small-
sized chaebols entered into the composition program. A substantial por-
tion of the independent ﬁrms (and a less substantial portion of small chae-
bols) did not qualify for any rehabilitation program after bankruptcy.
In 1998, the government introduced an out-of-court workout procedure.
Table 9.2 shows that, for large chaebols,the workout program was the main
method of settlement. Similarly, the workout program played an important
role among independent ﬁrms. By 1999, the role of the workout program
had increased signiﬁcantly, and most of the new bankruptcies (in terms of
asset size) were handled through the out-of-court workout procedure.
Examining the Pre-Exit Productivity of Bankruptcy Cohorts
Note that one of the most signiﬁcant changes in the 1998 revision was the
introduction of the economic eﬃciency criterion. The new revision required
that the courts compare the going-concern value of the ﬁrm with its liqui-
dation value for the initiation of judicial bankruptcy proceedings. A pre-
liminary analysis shows that the ﬁrms that ﬁled for bankruptcy between
1998 and 2000 experienced less persistent diﬃculties compared to ﬁrms ﬁl-
ing in 1997. For the ﬁrms ﬁling bankruptcy in 1997, their productivity was
lower than solvent ﬁrms several years before they entered into one of the re-
habilitation programs. Rehabilitation mechanisms applied to ﬁrms under
these conditions are most likely doomed to failure from the start. Rehabili-
tation procedures must target ﬁrms that undergo bankruptcy due to tempo-
rary setbacks and that have high potential for recovery. These characteris-
tics are present in the 1998–2000 cohorts. The introduction of the economic
eﬃciency criterion in 1998 appears to have aﬀected the types of ﬁrms tar-
geted. Note that the 1998 reform was initiated at the beginning of the year.
These hypotheses can be tested statistically in the following manner.
Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show regressions of productivity on a set of dummy


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.variables referring to the speciﬁc year bankruptcy cohort interacted with
the year dummy. Only the particular cohort and the group of solvent ﬁrms
are included in each regression. Therefore, the reported coeﬃcients are the
productivity diﬀerential between the speciﬁc bankruptcy cohort and the
group of solvent ﬁrms.
Table 9.3 shows that for the 1997 (corporate reorganization or composi-
tion) bankruptcy cohort, the reported coeﬃcients are negative from 1993
to 2000 and signiﬁcant from 1995 to 2000. The 1996 bankruptcy cohort
shows a similar pattern, but standard errors are large due to the small
sample size of the 1996 cohort. On the other hand, for the pre-exit years of
the 1998–2000 bankruptcy cohorts, the coeﬃcients are small and signiﬁ-
cantly negative only around the time of bankruptcy.
Table 9.4 shows a similar pattern of results for the proﬁtability variable.
Proﬁtability does not show a clear pattern for the pre-exit year productiv-
ity of failing ﬁrms. A possible interpretation of this result is that some ex-
plicit or hidden subsidies given to failing ﬁrms at the pre-exit years may
have worked to blur the pattern of persistently declining productivity for
the bankruptcy cohorts before the reform.
As discussed in section 9.2.2, the most crucial element in the postcrisis
court-administered bankruptcy system was the implementation of an eco-
nomic eﬃciency criterion. The court established and tightly enforced an
economic eﬃciency criterion in selecting qualiﬁed failing ﬁrms for the ju-
dicial rehabilitation procedures. One of the key criteria for all judicial
bankruptcy proceedings was to conduct a comparison of the value of a dis-
tressed ﬁrm as a going concern with its liquidation value.
Instead of economic eﬃciency, the prereform system was based on high
social value and prospects for rehabilitation. Note that the prospects for re-
habilitation could vary depending on the amount of subsidies from credi-
tors and the government. In comparison to the prereform system, the new
system removed the possibilities for interested parties (for example, con-
trolling shareholders, labor union, or local/central governments) to be in
the way of a failing ﬁrm’s exit. In other words, the new system contributed
toward removing the de facto exit barrier that beneﬁted large ﬁrms under
the in-court bankruptcy system prior to the crisis. Under the new system,
producers with persistently declining productivity were less likely to be
accepted into a rehabilitation procedure regardless of whether they exhi-
bited high social value such as a large output or employment share in the
economy.
9.3 Entry, Exit, and Aggregate Productivity Growth 
in Korea before and after the Crisis
In the previous section, it was found that ﬁrms accepted in the court-
administered rehabilitation program after the reform had less persistent
Bankruptcy Policy Reform and Total Factor Productivity Dynamics 309problems in prebankruptcy TFP performance than ﬁrms in a similar situ-
ation before the reform. We interpret this ﬁnding as lending support to the
argument that bankruptcy policy reform enhanced the eﬃciency of re-
source reallocation after the crisis.
How, then, is the bankruptcy policy reform likely to aﬀect the aggregate
TFP growth? To answer this question, we use plant-level data to examine
how resource reallocation by the competitive process of entry and exit con-
tributes to aggregate productivity growth.
Before proceeding any further, it may be helpful to provide a brief review
of the relevant literature. Recently, a growing number of studies have ex-
plored the relationship between the resource reallocation process of entry
and exit and aggregate TFP growth using plant- or ﬁrm-level data.5 Most
studies support the hypothesis that the process of entry and exit enhances
the aggregate productivity. This phenomenon is the result of at least one of
the following three eﬀects: market selection, learning, and “shadow of
death.” The market selection eﬀect is the part of the aggregate productivity
gain that results from the survival of the eﬃcient ﬁrms. The learning eﬀect
implies that surviving entrants become relatively more eﬃcient over time.
Finally, the “shadow of death” eﬀect denotes the phenomenon that exiting
plants exhibited relatively low productivity performance several years ear-
lier.6
Can we expect that the same forces are at work in Korea’s case? To an-
swer this question, we will discuss what the actual patterns of plant entry
and exit have been and whether the plant turnovers reﬂect productivity dif-
ferential among plants. Our methodology is based on Hahn (2000).7
9.3.1 Patterns of Plant Entry and Exit in 
the Korean Manufacturing Industry
In Hahn (2000), there are two types of entry: birth and switch-in. Birth
is deﬁned as a plant that ﬁrst appears in the data set. Switch-in occurs when
a plant switches from one market to another from one period to the next.
A market is deﬁned at the ﬁve-digit industry level. A continuing plant is
identiﬁed neither as birth nor as switch-in. Similarly, there are two types of
exit: death and switch-out. Death is deﬁned as a plant’s disappearance
from the data set in the next period, whereas switch-out occurs when a
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5. For a recent survey of the empirical literature in this vein, see Tybout (1996b), Caves
(1998), and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001).
6. With regard to the question of how much of the aggregate productivity growth is ac-
counted for by entry and exit, however, the available evidence seems mixed. For example, Fos-
ter, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) on the United States and Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001)
on Taiwan report a large role of entry and exit in aggregate productivity growth, while Baily,
Hulten, and Campbell (1992) on the United States and Griliches and Regev (1995) on Israel
ﬁnd a minor role.
7. See Hahn (2000) for a more detailed discussion on the methodology.plant moves out to another market in the next period. Under these work-
ing deﬁnitions, the actual patterns of entry and exit can be documented.
The contribution (in percent) of plant births and deaths are shown in
table 9.5 and table 9.6, respectively. These statistics are in terms of output
and number of plants. Speciﬁcally, table 9.5 illustrates what fraction of out-
put or number of plants for each year is attributable to plants based on
their age. Table 9.6 shows similar statistics for each year by group of plants
that die within a certain time period. Overall, the numbers below suggest
that plant turnover rate was quite high in the Korean manufacturing sec-
tor during the 1990–98 period.
According to table 9.5, plants less than ﬁve years of age accounted for
more than 25 percent of manufacturing production, except for the crisis
year of 1998. In 1998, the contribution from plants aged less than ﬁve years
declined sharply to 21.5 percent. This decline is attributable not only to a
fall in the birth rate but also to a rise in the closing of young plants, re-
ﬂecting the severe recession. In terms of plant number, the importance of
births becomes more pronounced; one- to ﬁve-year-old plants accounted
for about 65 percent of the total plants for each year, except for 1998. The
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Table 9.5 Contribution of Plant Births (unit: %)
Under 5 Years
1–3 4–5T otal Over 5 Years
Number Current Number Current Number Current Number Current
Year of Plants Output of Plants Output of Plants Output of Plants Output
1995 53.32 17.13 14.22 9.09 67.54 26.22 32.46 73.78
1996 47.60 15.36 18.68 11.11 66.29 26.46 33.71 73.54
1997 45.40 14.77 18.67 10.63 64.08 25.40 35.92 74.60
1998 39.45 12.77 18.63 8.68 58.08 21.45 41.92 78.55
Source: Hahn (2000).
Table 9.6 Contribution of Plant Deaths (unit: %)
Within 5 Years
Survive More Than 
1–3 4–5T otal 5 Years
Number Current Number Current Number Current Number Current
Year of Plants Output of Plants Output of Plants Output of Plants Output
1990 36.85 13.36 15.71 6.48 52.57 19.85 47.43 80.15
1991 37.41 14.52 17.11 7.62 54.52 22.14 45.48 77.86
1992 39.28 15.08 16.72 7.77 56.00 22.85 44.00 77.15
1993 43.71 14.92 20.23 9.13 63.93 24.05 36.07 75.95
Source: Hahn (2000).larger contribution of young plants in terms of plant number indicates the
relatively small size of those plants.
The new plant entry rate in Korea seems to be higher than most other
countries for which similar studies are available. For example, plants aged
less than ﬁve years account for about 25 percent of a given year’s output in
Korea; 13.6 to 18.5 percent in the United States; 18.3 to 20.8 percent in
Colombia; and 15.0 to 15.7 percent in Chile.8 Comparing the entry rate of
Korea and Taiwan might be useful since, even though both countries were
equally dynamic countries, these countries diﬀered vastly in their indus-
trial structure. That is, it is well known that Korea’s past economic success
relied heavily on chaebols, while Taiwan’s success depended on small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). If Korean chaebols employed a more
capital-intensive production structure requiring larger sunk setup costs
than SMEs in Taiwan, then it could well be conjectured that, combined
with policy related exit barriers, these costs worked as an entry barrier, thus
lowering the entry rate in Korea. Consistent with this hypothesis, the entry
rate in Korea reported by Hahn (2000) seems to be less pronounced com-
pared to Taiwan’s. In a similar study for Taiwan, Aw, Chen, and Roberts
(2001) report that one- to ﬁve-year-old ﬁrms account for approximately
one-third to one-half of the production in nine Taiwanese manufacturing
industries in 1991.9 Further study is required to shed more light on this
issue.
The plant death rate is also high in the Korean manufacturing industry.
This fact is not surprising given the high cross-sectional correlation be-
tween the entry and exit rates reported in the literature. Although there is
some variation over the years, more than half the plants, representing
about 20 percent of output, cease to exist within a span of ﬁve years. In
1993, the contribution of the plants that die within ﬁve years became sig-
niﬁcantly larger, reﬂecting the severe economic recession in 1998. The con-
tribution of plant deaths in terms of plant number is much larger than in
terms of output, indicating that the deaths are concentrated among the
smaller plants.
Plant death conditional on birth (not reported) is even higher than the
unconditional death rates reported above. In terms of both plant number
and output, the death rate conditional on births is much higher than the
unconditional death rate, especially during the ﬁrst three years of opera-
tion. Thus, new plants seem to fail easily, especially during the ﬁrst three
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8. The observation year varies by country. See Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) for
the United States and Roberts (1996) and Tybout (1996a) for Colombia and Chile, respec-
tively. The U.S. ﬁgure is based on ﬁrm-level data.
9. Unfortunately, a direct comparison of the two studies could be somewhat misleading be-
cause Hahn (2000) uses plant-level data while Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001) use ﬁrm-level
data. Nevertheless, relatively high entry rate in Taiwan seems to be a robust conclusion, since
entry rate measured at plant level would be higher than at ﬁrm level insofar as there are
multiplant ﬁrms.years. This fact might be due to, among other factors, the low productivity
of these plants on average during the early stages of operation. This result
is consistent with the theories of ﬁrm dynamics such as Jovanovic (1982)
and Hopenhayn (1992). Switch-ins and switch-outs (not reported) are also
frequently observed in the Korean manufacturing sector. In terms of out-
put, they are almost as important as births or deaths. Compared with
births or deaths, switch-ins or switch-outs are generally bigger in size.
9.3.2 Productivity Diﬀerential among Plant Groups at a Point in Time
Having described the plant entry and exit rates in the Korean manufac-
turing sector, we proceed to the issue of whether plant turnovers reﬂect cer-
tain patterns of productivity diﬀerential. We ﬁrst examine the relationship
between plant turnover patterns and plant productivity, both at a point in
time and over a period of time.10
Table 9.7 compares the unweighted mean productivity levels of plants
that exist in a given year. We split the sample into ﬁve plant groups as de-
ﬁned earlier. The main ﬁndings are summarized as follows. First, plants
that die in a given year are, on average, less productive than surviving
plants in that year. Depending on the year, failed plants (deaths) are about
3 to 6 percent less productive than continuing plants. This result is con-
sistent with heterogeneous plant- or ﬁrm-level models that predict that
market selection forces sort out low-productivity plants from high-
productivity plants.
Second, new plants (births) are on average less productive than continu-
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10. Plant productivity level is measured according to chained-multilateral index number
approach as developed in Good (1985) and Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) and employed
in Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001). For details, see Hahn (2000).
Table 9.7 Average Productivity of Plant Groups, 1990–98
Entry Exit
Year Continuing Birth Switch-In Death Switch-Out Total
1990 –0.005 –0.044 –0.026 –0.016
1991 0.046 –0.031 0.041 –0.003 0.050 0.026
1992 0.061 –0.005 0.061 0.018 0.068 0.046
1993 0.087 0.030 0.096 0.051 0.101 0.072
1994 0.132 0.056 0.141 0.101 0.144 0.118
1995 0.190 0.132 0.199 0.150 0.202 0.174
1996 0.197 0.143 0.208 0.160 0.214 0.185
1997 0.239 0.177 0.252 0.182 0.245 0.218
1998 0.256 0.200 0.267 0.249
Source: Hahn (2000).
Note: Unweighted averages.ing plants in the ﬁrst year that they are observed. Furthermore, new plants
are even less productive than failed ones. In fact, the productivity of a typ-
ical birth-plant is the lowest among all groups of plants in every year. Ini-
tial low productivity of birth-plants relative to continuing or failed plants
is not consistent with the presence of the simple vintage eﬀect that implies
that new plants are more productive than older plants. However, the result
is not necessarily contradictory to the prediction of several recent models
of plant dynamics, such as Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992). Po-
tential entrants who are uncertain about their productivity but hold a pos-
itive outlook on their postentry productivity performance—that is, who
expect they could catch up with the incumbents in terms of productivity
sooner or later—may enter despite their initially low productivity. Of
course, birth-plants are also heterogeneous in terms of productivity, as will
be discussed below.
The initial low productivity level of birth-plants relative to incumbents
is also documented by other studies, although these studies diﬀer from
ours in data and methodologies. For example, Aw, Chen, and Roberts
(2001) report that, in the case of Taiwanese manufacturing ﬁrms, entrants
in 1986 are between 0.6 percent and 6.9 percent less productive than in-
cumbent ﬁrms depending on industry. Meanwhile, table 10 in Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) reports that there is no statistical diﬀer-
ence between continuing plants and entering plants in terms of multifactor
productivity in 1987, based on ten-year interval analysis of plant-level data
on the U.S. manufacturing sector. However, the same table illustrates that
the cohort of plants that entered during the past ﬁve-year period, rather
than ten-year period, show lower productivity than continuing plants in
1987.11
Third, switch-in or switch-out plants have higher productivity than
birth- or death-plants, respectively. The productivity of switch-ins or
switch-outs is roughly comparable to continuing plants on average. Higher
productivity of switch-ins relative to birth-plants is consistent with the idea
that having experience in a related market is beneﬁcial. Also, the ﬁnding
that switch-outs have productivity levels comparable to continuing plants
seems to suggest that high productivity plants have mobility. Finally, each
new cohort of births is more productive than their previous cohorts. This
ﬁnding conforms well to the presumption of recent research and develop-
ment–based endogenous growth models, such as Grossman and Helpman
(1991), in that potential entrants gain from externalities due to previous in-
novation.
These ﬁndings suggest that plant turnovers, especially entry by birth and
exit by death, are not random events. In other words, the productivity of
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11. They report, however, that, in terms of labor productivity, entering plants have lower
productivity than continuing plants even at ten-year intervals.birth- and death-plants is more likely to be located at the lower end of the
productivity distribution. In particular, the lower productivity of failed
plants relative to continuing plants indicates that market selection forces
are at work as predicted by theoretical models of plant or ﬁrm dynamics.
Market selection of low-productivity plants from surviving high-
productivity plants is a process that enhances the aggregate level of pro-
ductive eﬃciency.
The lower productivity of new plants relative to continuing plants or
even failed plants is consistent with the prediction of theoretical models
and is similar to the experience of other countries. However, this ﬁnding
could cast doubt on the positive role of exit and entry on the aggregate eﬃ-
ciency gain. Speciﬁcally, the instantaneous eﬀect of resource reallocation
by plant deaths and births on aggregate productivity growth might be very
small or even negative. This result might be especially true if the resources
released by failed ﬁrms are entirely reallocated to birth-ﬁrms. Is this the
end of the story? The answer is no. To further elucidate this point, we now
discuss the dynamic aspects of the relationship between plant turnovers
and productivity. Speciﬁcally, we discuss postentry and pre-exit perfor-
mance of plants by focusing on market selection, learning, and the
shadow-of-death eﬀects.
9.3.3 Postentry Performance: Market Selection and Learning
To proceed, we exploit the longitudinal aspect of the data set to examine
whether market selection forces sort out low-productivity plants among
birth-plants. In our sample, there are eight cohorts of births according to
birth year from 1991 to 1998. Focusing on a particular birth-year cohort
has the advantage of controlling for the possible age eﬀect on survival. For
example, we examine whether plants that belong to the 1991 birth cohort
but die in 1993 have lower productivity at the time of death compared to
the other surviving members of the birth cohort. To do so, we regress plant
productivity on a set of year dummies (not reported) and a dummy vari-
able denoting whether the plant died after birth within the sample period
interacted with year dummies. Thus, the estimated coeﬃcients denote the
productivity diﬀerential between failures and survivors at the time of
death. The regression results for three birth cohorts are reported in table
9.8.
The table shows that, for each birth-year cohort reported, exiting plants
demonstrate signiﬁcantly lower productivity than surviving plants at the
time of death. Depending on the cohort year or death year, deaths are less
productive than surviving plants by about 3 to 6 percent. Thus, the evi-
dence from the Korean manufacturing sector clearly supports the presence
of a market selection eﬀect: Market forces sort out plants on the basis of
productivity.
As noted by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), the entry and exit
Bankruptcy Policy Reform and Total Factor Productivity Dynamics 315process also contributes to aggregate productivity growth through rapid
learning of surviving entrants. In the Korean manufacturing sector, the
learning eﬀect is also observed. To illustrate the point, let us examine the
productivity performance of the surviving members of the birth-plants rel-
ative to continuing plants. Figure 9.1 shows the average productivity of
birth cohorts that survived until 1998 by birth-year compared to continu-
ing plants in 1991 that also survived until 1998. Continuing plants increase
their productivity steadily and improve their average productivity by about
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Table 9.8 Market Selection among Birth Cohorts





Deaths 1994 –0.036 –0.042
(0.004) (0.003)
Deaths 1995 –0.032 –0.032
(0.004) (0.003)
Deaths 1996 –0.048 –0.030 –0.053
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Deaths 1997 –0.038 –0.044 –0.039
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Source: Hahn (2000).
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Fig. 9.1 Postentry productivity performance of surviving births: Learning
Source: Hahn (2000).23 percent during the 1991–98 period. Each birth-year cohort starts with a
productivity disadvantage relative to continuing plants at the year of entry.
However, every birth cohort exhibits a very rapid improvement in produc-
tivity following entry and catches up with continuing plants in terms of
productivity level after several years. The initial productivity diﬀerential
between birth- and continuing plants ranges from 6 to 10 percent depend-
ing on the birth-year. In the following year after entry, the productivity di-
ﬀerential narrows to only about 0 to 3 percent. In the third year after en-
try, the productivity level of birth-plants is roughly the same as, or even
slightly higher than, continuing plants. The 1991 birth cohort in particular,
which has the longest time series, maintains a higher average productivity
than continuing plants three years after entry. Thus, the results are clearly
supportive of the presence of a rapid learning eﬀect by surviving members
of birth-plants, especially during the ﬁrst several years after entry.
9.3.4 Pre-Exit Productivity Performance of Deaths: 
Shadow-of-Death Eﬀect
In order to understand the connection between the micro process of en-
try and exit and the aggregate productivity growth, it would be ideal if we
could examine the counterfactual phenomenon of what would have hap-
pened to the productivity performance of failed plants if they had sur-
vived. Unfortunately, this seems to be an impossible task. However, it
could prove to be beneﬁcial to examine predeath productivity performance
of death-plants in order to formulate an idea of the counterfactual. The is-
sue is whether plant deaths reﬂect a random or transitory event or a per-
sistently bad productivity performance record.
Figure 9.2shows the time series of the average productivity of plants that
existed in 1990 grouped by the year of death compared to plants that sur-
vived throughout the sample period. There are two points to be noted here.
First, there is a signiﬁcant productivity gap not only at the time of death
but also in the years preceding death between each death cohort and the
group that survived until 1998, even though each death cohort experienced
absolute productivity gain over time. This phenomenon suggests that plant
deaths reﬂect underlying productivity diﬀerences that have existed for a
long period of time. In other words, those diﬀerences are not just a result
of a random or transitory event. To take an example from the 1997 death
cohort, the productivity disadvantage relative to the surviving group is
about 6.5 percent in 1997. However, the productivity diﬀerential dates
back as early as 1990, when it is already as large as 3.7 percent. Similar re-
sults hold for other death cohorts. Thus, plant deaths seem to reﬂect not
only a disadvantage in productivity at a point in time but also a persistently
poor history of productivity.12
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12. Hahn (2000) shows that these results remain largely intact when taking into account the
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Fig. 9.2 Pre-exit productivity performance of deaths: Shadow of death
Source: Hahn (2000).
Second, the productivity diﬀerential between failed and surviving plants
tends to widen, especially during the periods nearing the death year. For
example, in the 1997 death cohort, the productivity diﬀerential ﬂuctuates
between 3.5 and 4.7 percent during 1990–96 period, but in 1997 it rises to
6.5 percent. Similar patterns are found for other death-year cohorts.
Thus far we have examined the predeath productivity performance of
death cohorts relative to surviving groups of plants and have observed
large and persistent productivity diﬀerences. The disparities often widen
over time during the period near the death-year. However, such large and
persistent productivity diﬀerences observed in ﬁgure 9.2 might reﬂect
other uncontrolled factors that diﬀer between survivors and failures, such
as plant age. That is, younger plants may be less productive and suﬀer
death more frequently than older plants. In order to control for this pos-
sible age eﬀect on productivity and survival, we also looked at the predeath
performance of plants that are born in the same year.
Figure 9.3shows predeath productivity of a 1991 birth cohort that is fur-
ther divided by the death-year compared to the 1991 births that survived
until 1998. For comparison, the productivity performance of 1991 contin-
uing plants that survived until 1998 is also shown. As expected, the per-
sistence of productivity diﬀerential among 1991 births is somewhat less
pronounced than suggested by ﬁgure 9.2. The 1991 birth-plants that die be-
fore 1998 do not demonstrate a noticeable productivity disadvantage in the
early years of operation compared to the surviving group. Especially in the
ﬁrst year of operation (1991), there is virtually no productivity diﬀerential
between surviving and failed plants.However, as surviving members of 1991 births improve their productiv-
ity at a faster rate, a productivity gap begins to develop and persists over
time. In addition, for each death-year cohort among the 1991 births, the
productivity disadvantage relative to the continuing group becomes the
largest in the last year they are observed. Thus, even if the possible age
eﬀect on productivity and survival is controlled for, plant deaths still reﬂect
somewhat persistent productivity disadvantage that often widens during
the period near death.
These ﬁndings seem to suggest that plant deaths reﬂect persistently poor
productivity performance, which often worsens near the death year. In
other words, low productivity of deaths is not just an outcome of random
or transitory events.
9.3.5 Entry, Exit, and Aggregate Total Factor Productivity Growth
The empirical evidence we have presented is summarized as follows.
Overall, plant deaths reﬂect persistently low productivity in the past. En-
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Fig. 9.3 Pre-exit productivity performance of deaths among 1991 birthstering plants may initially begin with a relatively low productivity level, but
over time, they go through the process of market selection: The ineﬃcient
fail and the eﬃcient survive. The surviving entrants experience rapid learn-
ing and become highly eﬃcient over time.
This pattern of productivity dynamics suggests that the major eﬀect of
resource reallocation of entry and exit on aggregate productivity will
emerge over time, even though the instantaneous gain may be small or even
negative. The evidence also suggests that policies that inhibit the resource
reallocation process of entry and exit of businesses are likely to be ineﬃ-
cient. In particular, although the cost of such policies may not appear im-
mediately, it will materialize and grow over time in the form of forgone
aggregate productivity gain. Alternatively, policies that improve the eﬃ-
ciency of resource reallocation, such as bankruptcy policy reform, may not
improve aggregate TFP instantaneously. However, the beneﬁts from such
policies will most likely be realized over time.
9.4 Concluding Remarks
This study has found that failing ﬁrms, which are accepted in court-
administered rehabilitation procedures after the bankruptcy reforms, had
less persistent problems in prebankruptcy TFP performance compared to
failed ﬁrms before the reforms. We interpret this ﬁnding as lending support
to the argument that bankruptcy policy reform improved the eﬃciency of
resource reallocation after the crisis.
To get an idea of how the bankruptcy policy reform aﬀects the perfor-
mance of aggregate TFP, we examined how the resource reallocation by
the competitive process of entry and exit contributed to aggregate produc-
tivity growth based on evidence from plant-level data on the Korean man-
ufacturing sector. The empirical analysis supports that, in Korea, exiting
producers exhibit persistently declining productivity whereas entering pro-
ducers that survive the market selection process show rapidly increasing
productivity. These speciﬁc patterns of productivity dynamics suggest that
policies that prevent resources from being reallocated eﬃciently via entry
and exit could potentially be very costly, with the cost growing over time.
Conversely, bankruptcy policy reform, which induces ineﬃcient ﬁrms to
exit and allocates the released resources to eﬃcient entrants or incum-
bents, would contribute to increasing the rate of aggregate productivity
growth.
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Data
Productivity Dynamics of Distressed Firms in Korea 
Firm-Level Productivity Measure
We use detailed ﬁnancial information on the ﬁrms that have external au-
dit reports. According to the Act on External Audit of Joint-Stock Corpo-
rations, a ﬁrm with assets of seven billion won or more must issue audited
ﬁnancial statements. The data thus include all ﬁrms with assets of seven bil-
lion won or more. For these data, ﬁrm productivity is estimated using the
chained-multilateral index number approach.
Data on Bankruptcy Filings by Distressed Firms
The information on corporate bankruptcy was gathered from various
sources such as the courts, the Financial Supervisory Service, and the
Bank of Korea.
Plant Productivity in Korean Manufacturing Sector
The data used for this section are from the unpublished plant-level data-
base underlying the Annual Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey.
The data cover all plants with ﬁve or more employees in 580 manufactur-
ing industries at the ﬁve-digit industry level. The data are an unbalanced
panel with approximately 60,000 to 90,000 plants for each year during the
1990–98 period, so that the total number of observations is roughly
700,000. See Hahn (2000) for details in measurement of plant total pro-
ductivity.
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This is a very interesting paper. First of all, I was impressed very much by
the sheer size of the data set, which covers over 37,000 observations. Using
this data set, the paper produces a number of powerful statistical results. I
think they are not only revealing by themselves but also provide very use-
ful information for the policymakers concerned.
I have only a couple of comments to make. My ﬁrst comment is that the
paper produces many invaluable statistical results in the tables and ﬁgures.
And yet the paper tends to be too sketchy in interpreting and explaining
those results.
The paper, for example, does not go very far in examining and evaluat-
ing the costs and beneﬁts associated with those bankruptcy policy reforms
and their consequences. The paper would gain a lot if it could try to dig into
the implications of these statistical results, from the perspectives of both
the ﬁrms and the government.
My second comment is that, despite a lot of data work, the paper seems
to fall short of presenting a sensible bankruptcy policy reform package for
Korea. If the authors ever want to come up with a sensible policy reform
package, they will have to take into consideration the following two aspects
very carefully.
One is that any policy reform package needs to properly reﬂect the
sources of ﬁrm failures. In fact, ﬁrm failures can be brought on by a vari-
ety of reasons. Some may originate from shifts in comparative advantages
due to changes in underlying factor compositions. Continued birth and
death of the ﬁrms is then a natural consequence. For this case, only a freer
entry and exit mechanism is to be desired.
Firm failures may also be caused by some unforeseen or unexpected fac-
tors such as ﬁnancial or political crisis or temporary worldwide recessions
induced by them. These factors are most likely to be beyond the control of
individual ﬁrms, but they can drive many ﬁrms into bankruptcy that oth-
erwise would have been healthy. Some kinds of social insurance program
may be desired for this case.
Yet some failures may be purely due to lack of management talent or
mismanagement on the part of owner-cum-managers in charge. A quick
liquidation process may be desired for this kind of circumstances.
Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration is that some
ﬁrm failures may be closely related with some country-speciﬁc factors such
as excessively powerful labor unions, lack of credit rating capability on the
part of ﬁnancial institutions, lack of transparency in related laws and reg-
ulations, or corrupted bureaucracy and unjust political inﬂuences. One
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ures in the case of Korea and use it in making a policy reform package. I
believe the experience of many Korean ﬁrms that suﬀered from these fac-
tors can provide invaluable information on this matter.
Comment Epictetus E. Patalinghug
Introduction
This study attempts (1) to examine the eﬀect of postcrisis bankruptcy
policy reform in Korea on the productivity of ailing ﬁrms, and (2) to ex-
amine how the reform would improve the performance of aggregate TFP
over time. The following discussion will cover the following issues and how
they are treated by the Lim-Hahn study: bankruptcy policy reforms, con-
ceptual framework, and eﬀect of entry and exit on productivity.
Bankruptcy Policy Reforms
The authors have adequately discussed how Korea’s corporate bank-
ruptcy system has evolved from court-administered procedures often
abused by the controlling shareholders of failing ﬁrms to a court-
administered system with a mandatory-liquidation provision feared by
failing ﬁrms. The old system in which old bankrupt ﬁrms were periodically
bailed out by the government was gradually replaced by the court-
administered bankruptcy system.
The paper points out that after some restrictions were put on the com-
position procedure in 1998, large ﬁrms with complicated capital structures
were not allowed to use this procedure. In 1997, large-sized chaebols pre-
ferred the corporate reorganization form of bankruptcy mechanism, and
beginning in 1998 the same ﬁrms preferred the workout procedure. The au-
thors’ argument is that the rehabilitation procedure must target ﬁrms that
undergo bankruptcy due to temporary setbacks and have high potential
for recovery. Under this condition, bankruptcy policy reform will enhance
the eﬃciency of resource allocation.
Conceptual Framework
The authors test the hypothesis whether there is a signiﬁcant productiv-
ity diﬀerence between speciﬁc year bankruptcy cohorts and the group of
solvent ﬁrms. However, the statistical tests to verify this hypothesis are not
very conclusive. First, the statistical tests do not include ﬁrms that utilized
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ness Administration, University of the Philippines.the workout procedure. Second, even among ﬁrms undergoing corporate
reorganization or composition, there is no clear pattern for the pre–exit
year productivity of failing ﬁrms when proﬁtability is used as the depend-
ent variable (table 9.4). And third, the inconclusive result in table 9.4 is ca-
sually dismissed as probably being due to some explicit or hidden subsidies
given to failing ﬁrms at the pre-exit years. Nevertheless, nowhere in this
paper is there a discussion or documentation (based on past studies) of the
magnitude of subsidies given to failing ﬁrms.
Eﬀect of Entry and Exit on Productivity
In section 9.3 of the paper, the authors tackle the role of the process of
entry and exit on aggregate productivity growth by examining whether
plant deaths reﬂect temporary bad luck or persistently bad productivity
performance in the past. The ﬁnding of the paper is that plant deaths re-
ﬂect persistently bad productivity performance. It concludes that policies
that hinder the process of entry and exit could be potentially very costly.
The pace of ﬁrm learning may be related to the nature of the Korean na-
tional innovation system. The link between learning and innovation (Lund-
vall 1992) may provide an explanation on the pattern of plant entry and
exit in Korea.
In using the chained multilateral index in estimating plant-level TFP, the
paper could have decomposed TFP into two components: (1) between-
plant variations, and (2) within-plant variations. Aw, Chen, and Roberts
(2001) not only decomposed ﬁrm-level productivity growth into several
components (continuing ﬁrms, entering ﬁrms, exiting ﬁrms, and market
share contribution) but went further and documented the cross-sectional
diﬀerences in TFP between exporting and nonexporting ﬁrms. The paper
could have broadened its perspective of the dynamics of Korean plants by
documenting the productivity diﬀerentials between domestic-oriented
plants and export-oriented plants.
Conclusion
This paper is very good at describing the bankruptcy policy reform ex-
perience of South Korea. The signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the types of settle-
ment (e.g., corporate reorganization, composition program, or workout
program) availed by top chaebols compared to small chaebols is revealing.
The relevance of the paper to other crisis-hit developing economies (e.g.,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) is its description of a
structured bargaining game among interested parties. For instance, the
Korean courts mainly oversee the process according to predetermined
rules. And court-administered procedure is biased against the controlling
shareholders of ailing ﬁrms. In contrast, the courts in other countries (e.g.,
the Philippines and Indonesia) need some tutoring on how to implement
the new provisions of their bankruptcy laws. Unlike the case of South Ko-
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the controlling shareholders of ailing ﬁrms. Finally, the paper likewise re-
veals that the workout (or out-of-court) procedure was the main form of
settlement for large-sized chaebolsin 1998 and 1999. This experience is also
popularly used by ailing corporate groups in other crisis-hit countries be-
cause it conveniently allows the introduction of noneconomic (e.g., politi-
cal) factors. The paper therefore is important in explaining how the design
of the bankruptcy mechanisms in the Korean experience veers away from
a tendency to rehabilitate ailing ﬁrms that do not have the potential for re-
covery. The paper is a very good addition to the literature on bankruptcy
policy reforms in crisis-hit economies.
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